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Introduction
In contemplating present-day Japan-Russia relations, one is bound to wonder why relations are so much 
complicated that even after 70 years from the end of WWII, there is still a generally shared impression that there 
is no stable ground for the two countries to conducting “normal” relations? To understand this complexity, it 
is necessary to analyze first how this difficulty emerged and took the shape as it exists now. This is the period 
basically after the end of WWII, particularly covering the war-end-year of 1945, San Francisco Peace Treaty 
of 1951, Joint Declaration of 1956 and probably extending to the whole Cold War period until the emergence 
of Gorbachev in 1985. Second, we need to see the process of negotiations under Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin 
when Russia went through turbulent changes. Third, we will analyze the contemporary period which may 
arguably be defined as Abe-Putin period starting from 2012. We need to see why and how so many windows 
of opportunity are missed. Last but not least, I would like to examine the possibility of a breakthrough in the 
contemporary period. The impact of rise of China in the region shall be analyzed in that context.
Section One: Cold War period, rise and structuralizing of territorial problem
From Japan’s point of view, the origin of territorial claims fundamentally dates back to several blows 
which it suffered from the Soviet Union at the closing period of WWII. First it was its betrayal. The Soviet 
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Union attacked Japan on August 8, while the Neutrality Pact was still in force. That feeling of betrayal was 
augmented because the Japanese government had sent a message conveying to Stalin the will of the Emperor to 
end the war and had asked him to transmit this message to Truman. Stalin conveyed that message to Truman, 
but nonetheless attacked Japan. Second it was combined with fear by the atrocities committed by the Soviet 
Union. Around 600,000 soldiers who were supposed to return home in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration 
clause 9 were interned and around 60,000 of them died in Soviet’s camp. Civilians, men and women, who were 
located in the area occupied by Soviet troops in Manchuria, North Korea and Kuriles vanished possibly in the 
order of 100,000 to 200,000. Lastly contradicting the Atlantic Charter and Cairo Declaration where “territorial 
aggrandizement” or “territorial expansion” are forsaken, the Soviet Union not only occupied the whole chain 
of the Kurile islands which Japan gained in exchange of Sakhalin in 1875, but also the four islands in its South, 
which was peacefully demarcated to Japan by the 1855 Treaty of Amity and Friendship.
*
But whatever the pains it incurred in 1945, Japan had to adapt to post-war reality. San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, signed on September 8 1951 became the first major step, and it was actually this Treaty which 
established first the reality of post-war territorial settlement. In accordance with Article 2(c), “Japan renounced 
all right, title, and claim to the Kurile Islands.” Since the Soviet Union which participated in this conference did 
not sign this treaty, that clause has not produced any legal or actual effect for the settlement. But circumstantial 
evidence remains that the Japanese delegation which joined the conference considered Habomai and Shikotan 
as part of Hokkaido, therefore not belonging to the Kuriles which it relinquished. But on Kunashiri and Etorofu, 
Prime Minister Yoshida limited himself by just stating that “the (Japanese) delegation cannot accept the Soviet 
Union’s position that Japan gained Kuriles as the result of its aggression.” Kunashiri and Etorofu constituted a 
part of the Kuriles that Japan renounced as Director General of Treaties Bureau Kumao Nishimura stated in the 
parliamentary debate on October 19, 1951.
One may therefore reasonably argue that had the Soviet Union signed that treaty, all territorial issues 
between Japan and the Soviet Union would have been resolved in favor of Soviet’s interpretation, and there 
were not only Kunashiri and Etorofu issue but also no Habomai and Shikotan issue left for future resolution. 
Stalin’s decision of not signing the treaty in 1951 in his protest against China’s absence at the conference was 
probably one of the greatest failures of Soviet post-war diplomacy.
Be it as it may because Japan and the Soviet Union did not make any agreement in 1951, the two countries 
decided to settle all war related issues and had intense negotiations from 1955 till 1956. On August 9 1955 
Soviet representative Ambassador Malik proposed the Japanese representative Ambassador Shunichi Matsumoto 
that “if all other issues are successfully resolved the Soviet Union is prepared to resolve the issue of Habomai 
and Shikotan.” The Japanese government, however, upon reflection did not accept this proposal as the basis of 
agreement and requested the reversion of Kunashiri and Etorofu in addition. Russian side refused this counter-
proposal, negotiations went into stalemate, and through the negotiations taken place in Moscow in 1956 finally 
the two sides agreed to the Joint Declaration signed on October 19, 1956. The two parties agreed in Article 9 “to 
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continue the peace treaty negotiations after the resumption of diplomatic relations” and that “the Soviet Union, 
in responding Japan’s request and taking into account Japan’s interest, agreed to transfer Habomai and Shikotan 
to Japan,” but “the actual transfer of these islands shall be made after the conclusion of the peace treaty.” 
Throughout the negotiations Russian side made it clear that Kunashiri and Etorofu was a non-existent issue, and 
the only reason why peace treaty could not be concluded was due to the inability of both sides to agree on these 
two islands.
This is how the fundamental framework for negotiations was established. In simple terms, the Soviet 
Union agreed to have Habomai and Shikotan transferred to Japan, Japan asserted that it requested Kunashiri and 
Etorofu in addition, the Soviet Union refused and the two sides made compromise in agreeing the wording of 
Clause 9 of the Joint Declaration. There is no ambiguity that thence onward Habomai-Shikotan and Kunashiri-
Etorofu gained different levels of negotiations. That structural difference will constitute the fundamentals of “four 
islands” negotiations.
*
There remain only two issues of importance that happened in the whole process of negotiations since then 
during the Cold War. First in responding to the conclusion of new security treaty with the United States in 1960, 
the Soviet Union sent on January 27, 1960 a note-verbal to Japan, indicating that the new treaty “creates a new 
situation which makes Soviet commitment to transfer Habomai and Shikotan impossible” and that “that transfer 
can only be made after all foreign troops’ withdrawal from Japan is made.” 
Second, in the general political climate under Détente, Kakuei Tanaka visited Moscow on October 7-10 
1973 and had talks with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. In the last meeting with Tanaka, Brezhnev agreed 
orally that “Unresolved issues from the time of WWII” prescribed in the communique include “four islands” 
issue.
Section Two: End of the Cold War and negotiations in the 1990’s and 2000’s under 
Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin
When Gorbachev assumed the post of General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985 there emerged an expectation 
in Japan that a breakthrough of the relationship may be achieved to resolve the territorial issues between the 
two countries, overcome the psychological rupture between the two countries, and improve substantially their 
relationship.
But notwithstanding the importance of the other country both for the Soviet Union and Japan, Gorbachev’s 
visit to Japan was retarded. Shevardnadze visited Japan in January 1986, immediately after he became foreign 
minister and expectation was rising high that Gorbachev’s visit takes place in early 1987. That expectation 
was dashed by sudden deterioration of the relationship resulting from Japan’s joining SDI research scheme 
organized by President Reagan, an allegation that Toshiba affiliated company leaked sensitive submarine engine 
technology to the Soviet Union, and some harassment to Japanese diplomats in Moscow. When these cooling 
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down ended and the relations began to warm up in 1988 by former Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to Moscow 
in May and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s visit to Tokyo in December, another delay occurred in the first half 
of the 1989. At the bilateral talks at the auspices of Chemical Weapons’ Convention conference in January 1989 
in Paris, the two sides plunged into serious debate as to which should be realized first, resolution of territorial 
problem or development of overall relations. This “theological debate” was overcome in May when the Japanese 
side proposed a new concept of “expanded equilibrium” and proposed to develop all aspects of the relationship. 
As the result of these two delays, however, when Gorbachev finally visited Japan on April 16-19 1991, 
his political power had already been considerably weakened by attacks both from the conservatives who 
insisted on the preservation of the Union of Soviet Republics and from the reformist forces strongly critical 
against Communist Party’s dictatorship. But notwithstanding this political weakness, Gorbachev established an 
important framework of negotiations for future bilateral relationship well reflecting the fundamentals of four 
islands issue. In the communique adopted at his visit, he acknowledged in writing for the first time in history 
that Kunashiri and Etorofu are object of negotiations and that it was necessary to resolve the question of these 
islands to conclude a peace treaty. He did not acknowledge however the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration 
which determined that Habomai and Shikotan shall be transferred to Japan after the conclusion of the peace 
treaty.
*
Four months after his visit to Japan, conservatives’ coup d’etat took place on August 19. The coup 
collapsed in three days’ time, then at the end of the year 1991 the Soviet Union fell and the Russian Federation 
was established under President Yeltsin, and through 1992, there opened probably the widest window of 
opportunity to settle the territorial problem between the two countries.
In the fall of 1991, responding to earnest plea by newly emerging Russian Federation to improve 
the relationship substantially, the Japanese government took rapidly three policy initiatives: At the end of 
September, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama declared at the United Nations General Assembly new Five 
Principles to govern Japan-Soviet/Russia relations. Then at the beginning of October, the Japanese government 
established a new policy of reform assistance of 2.5 billion dollars consisting of Ex.Im. Bank loan and 
Government guaranteed export insurance. At his October visit to Moscow, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama 
made the first concessionary proposal ever on the Northern Territories that “If the sovereignty of four islands 
to Japan is confirmed the timing, modality and condition of the transfer can be dealt with flexibly.” Then on 
December 25 1991 Gorbachev resigned from the Presidency and the Russian Federation succeeded the Soviet 
Union. Yeltsin assumed the post of its President.
At the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin’s administration was fully engaged in strengthening 
its relations with Western countries including Japan. Foreign Minister Kozyrev visited Tokyo in March 1992 
and made so called “non-existing confidential proposal”. The content was kept totally confidential for a long 
time, but from the time Russian side began to disclose it in 2012, both sides began to reveal their content. 
The memory of the Japanese side goes as follows: “to start negotiating the issue of transferring Habomai 
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and Shikotan; once an agreement is reached, to negotiate the issue of Kunashiri and Etorofu in line with that 
agreement; and once an agreement is reached, to conclude a peace treaty to resolve four islands issue.” Given 
the fact that this was the period when Russia was creating a new country based on democracy and market 
economy, that Japan’s economic might was at its highest whereas Russia suffered most the impact of the fall of 
the Soviet Union, one might analyze that it was the closest point for breakthrough from Japan’s perspective. But 
then Japan’s leadership considered that Russian proposal was insufficient because the “shadow of Kunashiri and 
Etorofu” was too weak. Russian disappointment resulted in President Yeltsin’s sudden cancelation of his visit to 
Japan in September 1992.
The two administrations did their best to remedy the situation. In G7 foreign and finance ministers meeting 
in April 1993 Japan declared another assistance package of 1.82 billion dollars. Yeltsin was invited to the Tokyo 
Summit in July and after the riot at the Russian Parliament in late September-early October, Yeltsin’s visit to 
Tokyo took place as scheduled from October 11 till 13 1993. Fundamentally the issues discussed then were 
the same as those discussed at Gorbachev’s visit in 1991. On Kunashiri and Etorofu the two sides agreed in 
the Tokyo Declaration that they were objective of negotiations. The three guiding principles of negotiations: 
“historical and legal facts, past agreed documents, and the principle of law and justice”, were satisfactory to the 
Japanese side, but none of the three principles had compelling power to go beyond recognition of the existence 
of the territorial problem. On Habomai and Shikotan, nothing was explicitly written in the Tokyo Declaration 
on the 1956 Joint Declaration. Yeltsin did not confirm it orally in his talks with Prime Minister Hosokawa and 
only confirmed it at the concluding press conference. So this issue was just resolved through half-way “indirect 
interpretation”.
*
After the Tokyo declaration both Russia and Japan entered into the period of domestic politics. Yeltsin 
had to win the election of 1996 to stabilize his power. In Japan political reform started early 1993 which ousted 
the Liberal Democratic Party from power. Japan-Russia relations entered into a relatively stable period when 
implementations of committed economic assistance became important. Some efforts also started to expand the 
relationship to military to military cooperation. Relations began to pick up only after Yeltsin’s reelection to the 
presidency in summer 1996 and his recovery in March 1997 from the heart operation that took place soon after 
his reelection. It was also the time for Russian leadership to look east after major decisions were taken to expand 
NATO eastward. In Japan LDP came back to power in 1996 under Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto who saw 
advantages in strengthening relations with Russia when increasingly rise of China and its rivalry with the United 
States caused fear in Japan of “abandonment” or “entanglement”.
Hashimoto and Yeltsin met at the Denver Summit in 1997 and agreed to hold “confidence building summit” 
somewhere in the Far-East until the end-year. In July, Hashimoto made a speech in Tokyo to conduct territorial 
negotiations based on the principles of “trust, mutual interest and long-term cooperation.” Russian side greatly 
appreciated this new approach. On November 1 and 2 1997 they met at Krasnoyarsk and agreed to conclude 
peace treaty by 2000 and Hashimoto proposed “Hashimoto-Yeltsin’s economic cooperation plan”. On April 18 
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and 19 1998, second “confidence building summit” was held at Kawana and a confidential proposal was made 
by Hashimoto “to delineate boundaries at the Northern side of the four islands and toumen (for some time to 
come) Japan recognizes Russia’s administrative right.” This was a proposal carrying on the approach taken 
by Foreign Minister Nakayama in October 1991 that “the timing, modality and condition of the transfer can 
be dealt with flexibly if the sovereignty of four islands to Japan is confirmed”. One may argue that Hashimoto 
went to the extreme in Kawana, i.e. while preserving the position of “sovereignty of four islands in a bunch”, 
de facto abandoning the issue of actual transfer. Judging from all available records, President Yeltsin showed 
great interest in this proposal. But thence onwards no Russian leaders in any politically or administratively 
responsible position agreed to this proposal.
Russia soon enters into economic crisis and Yeltsin’s health began deteriorating. Hashimoto left his position 
because of election failure in July and was replaced by his Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi. Obuchi made hisvisit 
to Moscow on November 12 1998 and had presidential meeting with Yeltsin. Russian counter proposal was 
made in the form of three-page paper and its essence was to conclude two treaties. The first treaty designated 
four islands to special economic zone with special legal status. The second treaty delineated the frontier and as 
such constituted peace treaty. But the Japanese side was not ready to treat this proposal as the basis of future 
agreement.
Since then the Japanese administration made its best to convince the Russian side that the Kawana proposal 
was the best to resolve the problem, whereas the Russian side made their best to convince the Japanese side that 
Moscow three-page proposal was the best to realistically solve the issue. Neither side succeeded in convincing 
the other. President Yeltsin declared his resignation on December 31 1999, formerly designating Vladimir Putin 
as acting-president of Russia.
*
From the time of Putin’s ascendancy to power for about one year the relationship saw unparalleled 
activation. On April 4, Muneo Suzuki, an influential LDP member appointed as Special Envoy of Prime 
Minister Obuchi, met with President-elect Putin. Since Obuchi had brain coma Suzuki spoke on behalf of LDP 
General-Secretary Yoshiro Mori, who was going to replace Obuchi. Suzuki obtained agreement from Putin to 
meet Mori at the end of April. From April 29 till 30, Prime Minister Mori visited St. Petersburg and had talks 
with President Putin, covering all aspects of Japan-Russia relations: the importance of strategic and geo-political 
relations, possibility of wide range of economic relations, and task of concluding peace treaty. From July 21 till 
23 Okinawa Summit was held. As the chair of the meeting, Mori greeted Putin warmly.
From September 3 till 6 2000, president Putin made his official visit to Tokyo. On September 4, President 
Putin stated in the summit meeting that “the 1956 Joint Statement is valid.” What was negated by Gorbachev 
to Prime Minister Kaifu, and what was only indirectly recognized by President Yeltsin to Prime Minister 
Hosokawa was thus fully recognized, though orally by President Putin. On September 5, “Statement on 
Peace Treaty Negotiations by Japanese Prime Minister and Russian President” was adopted, in which Tokyo 
Declaration of 1993 was recognized in writing. Since then rhythmical talks at summit level, foreign ministers’ 
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level and at officials’ level continued for seven months until Mori-Putin’s Irkutsk meeting on March 25th 2001. 
For the first time in Japan-Russia relations, the 1956 Joint Declaration which agreed on the transfer of Habomai 
and Shikotan and the Tokyo Declaration which stated the resolution of Kunashiri and Etorofu were written in 
the same document: “Irkutsk Statement”. Furthermore Mori proposed to Putin to hold parallel negotiations on 
Habomai-Shikotan and Kunashiri-Etorofu and Putin responded: “Posmotrim (Let us see).” Putin’s response 
to Mori’s parallel negotiations proposal was priceless. It goes without saying that nothing is guaranteed on the 
outcome of Kunashiri and Etorofu when the negotiations start. Precisely that outcome was expected to emerge 
as the result of the negotiations which should be conducted without any prior-conditions. The negotiations 
entered to its crucial stage.
But then, when Mori was replaced by Junichiro Koizumi at the end of April, and Makiko Tanaka was 
appointed as new foreign minister, confusion occurred on the Russian policy from within the Foreign Ministry. 
This became immediately intertwined with LDP power struggle on domestic reform. As the result of this 
confusion, Japanese government lost its power to pursue “parallel negotiations” in a way proposed by Prime 
Minister Mori at Irkutsk. Negotiations soon lost track.
Since the demise of the negotiations fundamentally few developments were worth recording until the re-
activation of the negotiations in 2012. May be three developments are worth noting. First, when Abe assumed 
the post of prime minister in 2006 relations started to warm up. At the bilateral talks held on the occasion 
of G8 Summit in Germany in 2007, Abe proposed “Eight Points Initiatives concerning the strengthening of 
cooperation between Japan and Russia in Eastern Siberia and Far-East”. The positive mood as reflected in that 
Summit was carried through to Toyako Summit in 2008 between Prime Minister Fukuda and newly elected 
President Medvedev.
Second, another unexpected sign came from Abe’s Foreign Minister Taro Aso in his parliamentary 
debate in December 2006. Just upon publication of a book written by Professor Akihiro Iwashita of Hokkaido 
University “Neither four, nor zero, nor two” Aso expressed his interests in “unorthodox” approach to resolve 
the territorial problem through “dividing the space into half”. Although such approach was immediately denied 
by MOFA, no one was reprimanded by expressing that “heresy”. When that Aso became prime minister in 
2008 and appointed Shotaro Yachi, who worked as Vice Minister for Foreign Minister Aso in 2006, as Special 
Assistant to the Prime Minister on Russian affairs, some expectation rose that a new thinking may be emerging. 
On February 18 2009 Aso and Medvedev met in Sakhalin and the two sides agreed to pursue “new, creative and 
unconventional approach”.
But all these expectations were again dashed just before an important bilateral meeting was supposed to 
take place on the occasion of G8 Summit to be held in July in Italy. Aso repeated in a parliamentary debate 
Japanese government’s standing position that “Russian occupation of the four islands is unlawful”. President 
Medvedev took this statement as an open provocation shown when Russia was preparing a serious negotiation. 
Nothing therefore happened in Italy.
Third, Yukio Hatoyama’s appointment from DPJ to the post of prime minister in September 2009 rose for 
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a short while expectations that warm relations might come back because Hatoyama was grand-son of Ichiro 
Hatoyama who, as Japan’s Prime Minister, established diplomatic relations with Russia by the 1956 Joint 
Declaration. But that expectation was dashed on November 24, 2009, when Hatoyama Government used the 
word of “unlawful occupation” in responding to a Shitsumon Shuisho (Official questions to the government 
raised by parliamentarians). Relations turned from bad to worse and on November 1 2010 Medvedev became 
the first Russian President to visit Kunashiri. Feeling of resentment in Japan was well reflected in Prime Minister 
Naoto Kan’s statement on February 7 2011, the day of “Northern Territories”, denouncing Medvedev’s visit to 
Kunashiri as “impermissible outrage”. After the tsunami and earthquakes on March 11 2011, slight warm up of 
the relations occurred by Russian reaction of sympathy to those who suffered heavily in Japan, but the opening 
of a new window of opportunity had to be waited until 2012 upon the comeback of Putin in Presidency and Abe 
in Prime Minister-ship. 
Section Three: Present window of opportunity, opened since 2012 to this day 
The starting point of today’s window of opportunity was Prime Minister Putin’s press conference on 
March 1 2012 to the correspondents of G8 countries. Asked about the status of Japan-Russia relations by 
Hirofumi Wakamiya of Asahi Shimbun, Putin stated that “If I am elected as president, then I would like Japan 
and Russia to enter into close economic partnership as well as to resolve the territorial problem by achieving 
‘draw (hikiwake, in Judo terminology)’”. When Wakamiya stated that the Japanese would not be satisfied by 
“two islands solution” as the basis of hikiwake, Putin responded that “you are not a diplomat and I am not a 
president yet. So when I shall be re-elected as president, let us give instructions to the two foreign ministries to 
start the negotiations (using another Judo word ‘to start (hajime)’. Unfortunately the Noda Government of DPJ 
was not in a position to activate the negotiations because Noda’s almost exclusive interests were directed to 
the consumption tax and social security issues. But when Abe came back as Prime Minister in December 2012 
things began to look differently. Like all ambitious prime ministers Abe must have been interested to resolve the 
two remaining issues from WWII, conclusion of peace treaty with Russia and normalization of relations with 
North Korea. But in addition, he could be particularly enthusiastic in breaking the ice with Russia because that 
was what his father, Shintaro Abe, had really wanted in dealing with President Gorbachev, but unable to achieve 
because of his ailing health.
Based on thorough preparations Abe visited Moscow in April 2013. Around fifty top-class businessmen 
accompanied Abe to demonstrate Japan’s interest in developing economic relations, and Abe proposed to open 
“Two Plus Two” meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers, next to the United States and Australia. On the 
territorial problem the two sides agreed in the communique to “conclude a peace treaty through a solution 
acceptable to both sides.” Negotiations started from then and although it appeared that it was a heavy going 
process, relations began to warm up, culminating to the opening ceremony of Winter Olympics held at Sochi, 
held on February 7 2014. Three Foreign dignitaries attended the open-ceremony on that day, Abe, Xi Jinping 
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and Dutch Prime Minister. Putin received Abe with special attention to host him for lunch on the 8th. Japanese 
media highlighted their personal relations and claimed that perhaps Putin stands closest among top foreign 
leaders for Abe.
*
This situation saw a complete draw back when serious collision occurred at Maidan Nezaleiznosch in Kiev 
between rivalling pro-Western and pro-Russian factions. This collision resulted in swift annexation of Crimea 
by Russia, stern criticism against Putin on his Crimean and Ukraine policy by US led G7, de facto expulsion of 
Russia from G8, and introduction of series of economic sanction on Russia. 
It so appeared that the policy adopted by Abe was to achieve two objectives. One was to follow the 
consensus reached by G7 and join all major policy decisions including introduction of economic sanctions. 
Another was to minimize the content of its sanction and make it happen as late as possible. That policy took 
place in relations to Japan’s first sanction adopted on March 18, 2014; second sanction on April 29; third 
sanction on August 5, and the fourth sanction on September 24th. It is not easy to analyze Russian reaction on 
traceable evidence, but it seems to be fairly clear that sometimes in the autumn of 2014 time has come for them 
to consider that “enough is enough.”
The issue of Crimea and Ukraine has profound implications to Russian history and geopolitics. Kiev is the 
origin of Russia for all students engaged in the study of Russian history. Crimea with its history dating back 
to Crimean Cossacks and the battle of Sevastopol at the Crimean War of 1853-56 has an enduring memory of 
tragic legend of modern warfare and Russian national dignity. More importantly through the whole course of 
Russian modern to contemporary history, through WWI and WWII in particular, Ukraine proved to occupy such 
an important geopolitical position as a crucial buffer between Russia and Europe. Russia simply could not afford 
a Ukraine adversarial to Russia and bent exclusively toward Europe. The economic and political confusion even 
after 20 years of independence offered an opportunity to reshape the map, particularly after Ukraine political 
turmoil from November 2013 and after the Maidan explosion of 18-21 February 2014. Regaining Crimea, and 
ensuring a buffer sate in Ukraine, which at least include several eastern provinces became a matter of survival, 
honor and dignity for Russia.
Japan’s participation in four economic sanctions from March to September 2014, even if they were carried 
out at the very end with minimal content, shows profound lack of understanding about Russian core values, both 
historical and political. How can Russia resolve a territorial issue in a way for Russia to take a concessionary 
decision to bring the situation to a “draw”? Thus from the autumn of 2014 there disappeared any perspective 
to see a peace treaty with a solution of four islands issue based on a “draw” solution. Political tensions began 
to hit the relationship deeply during the following year, 2015. On September 2 2015, according to Itar-Tass, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Margurov stated that “we will not negotiate with Japan in any way. South Kurile 
was transferred to our side as the result of WWII. There is no question that Russian sovereignty and jurisdiction 
are extended over these islands.” He also explained that the responsibility of the rupture of negotiations lies 
in the Japanese side which joined the economic sanction. Foreign Minister Kishida met with Foreign Minister 
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Lavrov on September 21 2015 in Moscow, but Lavrov made it clear after the talks that “We have not discussed 
territorial problem. The issue in agenda was the one of the conclusion of the peace treaty.” This message, which 
sounds in Japanese ears that Russia accepts only peace treaty without resolving territorial problem, is a position 
which Japan heard so forcefully from the latter part of the 1970’s under Gromyko until Gorbachev assumed 
power in 1985.
*
To the amazement of many, apparently this was not the end of the history. On the one hand, Putin’s 
international position may have been somewhat raised. On Ukraine, Russian close attachment to the eastern 
provinces such as Donetsk and Lugansk was obvious but the Minsk agreement became a generally accepted 
basis for future settlement including Russia. Supply of energy resources from Russia to Ukraine was not entirely 
at stalemate. Even more importantly Russian active participation, militarily and diplomatically, in the totally 
confused situation in Syria where ISIS and President Asad do not back away has produced certain impacts, 
which other engaging actors could not ignore. 
At the same time, Abe’s Russian policy of “chasing two rabbits” which was doomed to fail thus far, might 
have produced some results. On February 9 2016 Abe and Obama had telephone-talks primarily on the issue of 
North Korean nuclear weapons. But on February 23, several Japanese media began to report quoting “sources 
in charge of Japan-US relations” that Obama requested to postpone Abe’s programmed visit to Russia until after 
the Ise-G7 Summit, but Abe did not agree and stated that “For Japan peace treaty with Russia is also important. 
We need to continue dialogue with Russia”(Yomiuri Shimbun February 26, 2016). Whatever the political motives 
and calculation, Putin’s administration began to respond to Abe’s call for dialogue. Lavrov made his trip to 
Tokyo in April. Before his visit, on April 12, he stated in his press conference that he did not refuse the Irkutsk 
Statement, its major meaning is to continue talks to resolve all issues, including the question of belongingness of 
four islands, and that whereas the Irkutsk Statement was just a statement, the only document that was ratified by 
both sides is the 1956 Joint Declaration. In short this Lavrov’s statement gives an impression that Russia began 
moving its position back toward Irkutsk in 2001.
As it turned out to be, Abe-Putin’s meeting at Sochi on May 6, prior to the Ise-Shima G7 Summit, brought 
certain excitement to those who followed Japan-Russia relations. On the economic front following up what 
has been agreed in his April 2013 visit to Moscow, Abe proposed eight points economic cooperation program, 
which was apparently well received by Putin. On the territorial problem, Abe appeared in front of the press 
after his meeting with Putin, and stated in somewhat exalted mood that “I received solid response (by President 
Putin) to make a breakthrough putting down the stagnation thus far accumulated”, “We (President and I) were 
in agreement to resolve this issue by two of us”, and that “A new approach which will be freed from past ideas 
shall be sought (by us) so as to step up the negotiations.”
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Section Four: What can the “new approach” be to make a breakthrough?
Obviously, those who follow Japan-Russia relations began to ask since Abe-Putin’s Sochi meeting, what 
is this “new approach?” Neither Abe, nor Putin, nor anyone who is in a responsible position have not disclosed 
what this “new approach” is, and none of them should disclose it. One may reasonably assume that it has to be a 
solution of “draw” where neither side loses. But if so, if anyone should disclose the content of “new approach”, 
due to the sensitivity of this issue from respective country’s nationalism, that “new approach” would be under 
fire by political forces which do not want to see any compromise and crushed almost immediately. 
But in order to give my own image of this “new approach” I introduce herewith a proposal which I made 
public in July 2013, just two years ago. I labelled this proposal as “two plus alpha” solution. Why should it 
be “two plus alpha” solution? Because what Japan is requesting is four islands, and what Russia has agreed to 
transfer was two islands. Both sides might have reservation to this proposal. The Russian side may well argue 
that their original position is zero and two was maximum possible concession which they had already made 
in 1956 and there is not an inch of further concession. But the Japanese side may well argue that based on the 
principle of territorial non-aggrandizement prescribed in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration 
Japan has its full right for the whole Kurile Islands, and four islands solution is already a “draw” solution 
from where Japan cannot deviate even an inch. But if the two sides continue these original positions, there is 
practically no hope to find a mutually acceptable “draw” solution. So while acknowledging the difficulty of 
this issue I based my position that “something” should come out from “Kunashiri and Etorofu” and labelled 
this “something” as alpha. Or else, I may simply draw on to the format agreed at Irkutsk to conduct parallel 
negotiations on Kunashiri and Etorofu and Habomai and Shikotan, and assuming that some compromised 
solution may appear from the Kunashiri and Etorofu channel, I labeled it just “alpha”.
But then what “alpha” can there be? When Abe and Putin seem to have made a genuinely perspective start 
at Abe’s April 2013 visit to Moscow, Ambassador Panov and I had a lone negotiation through May to July to 
give an example to this “alpha”. The result of this joint effort was published in the Nezavisjimaya Gazeta as of 
July 19th 2013 and reported back on the same day in Asahi Shimbun with the full translated text in Digital Asahi. 
The gist of this joint proposal was to achieve the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan as is prescribed 
in the 1956 Joint Declaration. Since President Putin assumed his post in 2000, it has been well known that he 
became the first President who officially acknowledged the 1956 Joint Declaration after Gromyko denied its 
implementation in 1960. As for Kunashiri and Etorofu, we proposed to establish a Special Joint Economic 
Zone which has a special legal status acceptable to both sides. Ambassador Panov and I did not produce this 
joint proposal out of the blue. As the last proposal made by the Russian side under President Yeltsin an idea of 
establishing a joint economic zone where a joint legal structure may be incorporated had already been made 
in November 1998 in Moscow to Prime Minister Obuchi. Panov-Togo joint proposal was based on these two 
historical documents which did exist sometimes during the negotiations and just added them up: to apply the 
1956 Joint Declaration to Habomai and Shikotan, and then to apply the four-islands special economic zone 
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proposal to Kunashiri and Etorofu.
It goes without saying that the Panov-Togo joint proposal has left several important issues unresolved. 
Some obvious issues include, when and with what content would the “peace treaty” as envisaged in the 1956 
Joint Declaration be concluded, or where would the border be demarcated in this “breakthrough” agreement. 
But the article in Nezavisimaya just expressed hope that these complex issues can be resolved by the wisdom 
and hard work of diplomats who are actually in charge of the negotiations
*
Without prejudging in anyway, what kind of “new approach” Abe may really introduce, let me examine 
though very briefly the likelihood of the success of Togo-Panov joint proposal. As said above, it naturally 
depends much whether an answer which is satisfactory to both sides could be found or not. But suppose that 
answer could be found, will Abe take it and resolve the issue? Let us examine from the three layers of IR theory 
as was developed by Kenneth Waltz.
First, let us consider about the individuals, particularly leaders who are in a position to take decisions. 
As said, Shinzo Abe has several reasons why he wants to take new and bold decision and resolve the long 
stagnated issue. He is an ambitious prime minister who wants to leave his name in history. His mentor-politician 
is his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi, whose legacy is to have taken leadership in revising the Security Treaty 
against tide of protest and demonstration, the strongest of all post-war Japanese political movement. Abe’s next 
mentor-politician, his father Shintaro Abe’s most regretted unfinished agenda was perhaps “normalization of 
the relationship with Russia” as is eloquently written in his important writing “Toward a New Country”. He has 
reasons to search a compromise idea, let it realize even if there is strong opposition. In May 2016, Abe’s tenure 
was expected to end in two years’ time. His press statement to “resolve this issue by two of us” should mean 
that if he really wanted to do so, he needed to move fast. 
Second, about domestic political situation, one may arguably divide Japanese people in three categories. 
First a large number of people who is not interested in territorial issues or the suffering his or her elderly 
generation went through seventy years ago. They may follow any decision which Abe may take based on 
hikiwake principle. Second, among those who are genuinely and constantly concerned on the territorial problem 
with Russia, there are so called nationalists who think and whose voices are vocal in asserting “four islands in 
a bunch” solution. But third, there are those who are seriously concerned that “four islands in a bunch” solution 
has not resolved the issue for seventy years and time is against them. In my encountering to Japanese public 
opinion in my regular lecturing, recognition that “a new approach” is needed to break present-day stalemate 
is increasing. Abe’s credentials to be the prince of conservative politicians allow him to take bold decisions, 
because he has reasons to believe that nationalists who usually assert that the only policy which Japan may take 
“four islands in a bunch” may ultimately follow him even if he takes a different decision.
Third, as for international situation which surrounds him, the situation is very complex. On the one hand, 
Abe is facing a very serious situation of rise of China. His primary responsibility is to settle relations with 
China through deterrence and dialogue. But in addition his natural foreign policy objective is to have improved 
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relations with all major neighboring countries in East Asia, and certainly that includes Russia. Strategic 
calculus goes toward bold decision. But he has an inherent contradiction that a too bold decision might harm 
his relationship with the United States, which under Obama administration, was very critical against Putin, 
denouncing him as a destroyer of “post-Cold War international order”. It may well be that to take a bold decision 
both on territorial issues and economic cooperation, Abe needs to take a more “autonomous position” vis-à-
vis the United States, and that might be an extremely difficult choice. Abe may need to come up with a new 
position something along the following line: “For Japan the single greatest threat it is facing is China and not 
Russia. Japan’s primary attention therefore in its foreign-security-defense policy is China and Japan needs to do 
everything necessary to face China based on its policy of deterrence and dialogue. But from this perspective the 
wisest policy of G7 is to keep Russia within the friendly circle of G7, and for this the critical policy necessary 
is to treat Russia with respect as a great power which needs to preserve its dignified position in international 
arena. For this it is rational and justifiable to recognize historical bondage between Russia and Crimea and 
the geopolitical necessity to see Ukraine as a buffer state between Russia and Europe. Particularly we need to 
recognize the critical importance of such eastern provinces as Donetsk and Lugansk for Russia. These should 
be common goals of G7 for the interests of G7, and Japan is going to take a leadership position toward that 
direction.”
Conclusion
Would Abe succeed in resolving the territorial problem with Russia? At the point of writing of this paper, 
it is hard to come up with a convincing conclusion. I do think that there is a definite willingness and readiness 
to focus on this issue in Abe in person. Abe’s domestic position as the prince of conservative leadership allows 
him to take a bold decision. So his difficulty does not come from his domestic position. His greatest challenge 
comes from the international situation, in particular in facing U.S., possibly other G7 countries such as Canada 
or Great Britain, to stay strictly within the agreed framework of continuing sanctioning Russia. Thus in a way 
much will depend on the changing structure of power in East Asia. This is an issue which needs careful scrutiny 
which goes beyond the intended scope of this paper.
END
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